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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical and empirical investigation of tax competition when
voters use the tax policy of neighboring jurisdictions as information to evaluate the
performance of their incumbent politicians. We show that this has implications both for voter
tolerance of high taxes and for the process of tax setting itself, Our empirical results, which
use two different tax data sets, confirm the importance of neighbors' taxes both on the
probability of incumbent reelection and on tax setting behavior.
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I. Introduction
This paper models tax competition when voters choose whether or not to reelect
officials based on their performance while in office. We focus on the idea that rational
voters may use neighboring jurisdictions to evaluate the perfurmance of their incumbents.
We provide both a theoretical framework to illustrate this and an empirical analysis that
uses data from US states for the period 1960 —1989.
Our starting point is a world with asymmetric information between voters and
politicians —thelatter are assumed to know more about the cost of providing public
services than the former. Politicians also differ in their type. Good ones do no rent
seeking, whereas bad ones finance their whims at taxpayers' expense. The problem for
voters is to distinguish between the two.Consonant with the large literature on
multi—agent incentive schemes (see, for example, Holmstrom (1982)), we show that it
makes sense for voters to appralse their incumbents relative performance. Thus if states
face correlated shocks affecting the costs of providing public services, then the information
gleaned from another jurisdiction's taxes is valuable for their own jurisdictions.
A theoretical model of this kind predicts that the reelection performance of one
jurisdiction will depend both upon the jurisdiction's own tax policy as well as that of its
neighbors. In particular, if a state has high taxes relative to its neighbors, citizens
interpret this as evidence that their official is bad and unseat him at the next election.
Our empirical evidence is consistent with this view.
A second theoretical prediction is that tax setting behavior is affected by electoral
competition. In particular, states may trim tax rate increases which put them out of line
with their neighbors. Thus, we have a kind of yardstick competition, studied previously by
Shleifer (1985) among others, in which agents use the performance of others as a
benchmark. This too is consistent with our empirical results.
That asymmetric information may be important in political systems has been
widely recognized, especially in the context of the spending decisions on local public goods2
and services. Bradford, Malt and Oates (1969) argue that it is difficult for voters to infer
the level of services that will be delivered for any given expenditures. This makes it
difficult to determine which states provide services efficiently.
The predominant analytical framework for tax competition is the Tiebout model',
which in its purest form argues that resource flows between jurisdictions obviate the need
for political competition.2 There has however been much debate about the extent to which
resource flows alone will work. For example, Epple and Zelnitz (1981) have argued that,
even in the long run, allowing individuals to sort into jurisdictions will not eliminate rent
extraction by states and that the model needs to be augmented by a political framework.
This paper has spawned a heated discussion.3 Whatever the merits of these arguments, it
seems reasonable to suggest that resource flows can only be a long run solution to
differences in the tax policies of states. In the short run, the ballot box may serve an
important function and even in the long run may be a less costly alternative to migration.4
We shall therefore make this the focus of our investigation here. Our results support the
view that electoral competition affects state tax setting.
That a governor's chance of reelection might in part depend on his track record on
taxes has long been noted in the political science literature. Beyle (1983), for example,
suggests that taxes were a "key issue" in the defeat of 30% of the governors who were not
reelected in the 1960s and in the defeat of 20% of such governors in the 1970s.5 In a
'Other models include Kanbur and Keen (1991), which examines implications of
cross—border shopping, rather than having individuals relocating. This is, of course, most
appropriate for indirect taxes.
2See Rubinfeld (1987) for a survey of Tiebout models; empirical and theoretical.
'See, for example, Henderson (1985). Epple and Romer (1989) argues that the key
assumptions concern the extent to which jurisdiction boundaries are flexible.
4The view that the time frame for the analysis is important is borne out by the analysis of
Epple, Romer and Filimon (1988). In addition, New York Times (1991) surveys attitudes
of key industrialists about what determines their firms' location decisions. Taxes are cited
as being only the 12th most important factor determining this choice.
'Beyle, p.2153
similar vein, Hansen (1983) cites evidence that tax issues began to "figure prominently in
decisions to vote for or against a particular party or candidate" in the mid 1970s in
determining the outcome of congressional and presidential races. Moreover, taxes were
mentioned directly by 15% of those surveyed in 1980 as a factor in their ballot choices.
The analysis is also related to other recent work in formal political economy,
particularly that which has emphasized agency problems, such as Banks and Sundaram
(1991), Austen—Smith and Banks (1989) and Rogoff (1990), for example. We differ from
these mainly in incorporating relative performance in the voting decision.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II we introduce the
problem by looking at our data and the basic history which colors our interpretation of the
evidence. Section III presents a simple theoretical analysis which provides the basis of the
empirical work. In Section IV, we extend the model to give a workable empirical
specification. Section V presents the results and Section VI concludes.
II. Preliminary Data Analysis
In the analysis that follows, we will use data on the reelection bids of governors in
the continental United States from 1960 through 1989. Table 1 shows the reelection
histories of governors during this period. In what follows, we assume that eligible
governors who did not stand for reelection, and who did not run instead for another office,
chose to step down because they assumed they would lose and/or were pressured to do so
by dissatisfied party officials. In the empirical analysis below, we will control for the age of
governors who chose not to stand for any elected office. (The reader should note that
repeating our analysis excluding the "retired" group results only in an increase in the
standard errors.)
Table 1 suggests that a non—trivial proportion of governors eligible for reelection
6Hansen, p. 1774
either chose not to run or were defeated at the polis.7 During this thirty year period, there
are only two years in which more than half of all incumbents are reelected. In a majority
of the even year elections, between 15 and 40 percent of governors eligible for reelection
lost either in the primary or in the general election.
Our analysis makes use of two data sets on taxes. The first contains data on the
effective income tax liabilities of joint filers in each of the 48 continental states. These
data, generated at the National Bureau of Economic Research using the TAXSIM program,
accurately capture the income tax liabilities that governors and legislatures envisioned for
taxpayers in different income categories. These liabilities are quite appropriate for the
analysis at hand: the effective tax calculations control for the effects of federal taxes and
local property taxes paid, when calculating the taxes owed to state governments, and
reflect the will of the elected officials. However, because TAXSIM estimates are available
only for the period 1977—88, and since the estimates are available only for income taxes, we
make use of a second data series constructed from data published annually in the
Statistical Abstract of the United States. These tax data are real per capita income and
sales taxes collected by state for the period 1960—89. While having the advantage of being
more comprehensive in terms of state taxes covered, such tax data may be a less accurate
reflection of elected officials' intentions, as taxes paid also reflect economic conditions
within the state. As the reader will see, our results are robust to the choice of data set.
Both data sets reveal that tax liabilities vary markedly between states for a given
income category. For example, effective income tax liabilities for $60000 joint filers were
$108 in Tennessee in 1980, while they were $4700 in New York State in that year. In large
part these differences reflect diversity across states in the division of taxing authority
between state and local levels of government. States also differ in their demand for public
TIn many states, governors face a term limit. Cases in which this binds will not be included
in out voting analysis. However, term limits can and will be used to shed light on tax
setting in what follows.5
services which also will be reflected in tax liabilities. It thus makes greater sense to focus
on changes in tax liabilities across states, rather than comparisons of the leveLs. We also
maintain that a model based on agency problems due to asymmetric information about
shocks to the cost of providing public services naturally gives way to a specification where
changes in taxes matter.8
A key idea in our paper is that voters may compare tax changes in their state with
those in neighboring states before heading to the polls, making elected officials sensitive to
how tax changes in their state compare with those of their neighbors. Incumbents would
then be more likely to face defeat if they increase taxes and are less likely to, ceteris
pan bus, if their neighbors increase taxes. Thus, we would expect to see two main things in
the raw data.First, taxes charged in neighboring states would tend to be positively
correlated. In addition, not being re—elected would be positively correlated with a tax
increase in one's own state and negatively correlated with tax changes in other states.
As a first look at this, Table 2 presents correlations in changes of effective income
tax liabilities (t—(t—2)) between states with their geographic neighbors for the 10 year
period 1979—88, using the TAXSIM data. We define "neighbors' tax change" as the
average change in tax liability/real tax revenues (depending on the data set) of
geographically neighboring states.9 Table 2 reveals that there is a significant amount of
correlation between neighbors' tax changes and a given state's tax changes, with the
Pearson correlation coefficient ranging from 0.18 for the $25000 income group to 0.30 for
the $100000 income group. For all groups, this correlation is significant. This could, of
course, be explained by a number of different things and below we will be careful to control
The idea that innovations should be important is characteristic of previous related
analyses, e.g. Peltzman (1990).
9We choose a geographical definition of neighborliness for two main reasons.First,
geographic neighbors are quite likely to experience similar shocks to their tax bases and, for
this reason, provide information on the size of the innovation to each others' voters.
Second, geographic neighbors capture as near as possible the idea that states belong to the
same media market, having good information about what is going on close by.6
foryear effects and the possibility that neighbors face common shocks.
Correlations between increases in effective income tax liabilities and incumbent
defeat are also interesting. The second part of Table 2 presents some evidence on this.
Changes in a state's income tax liability are positively and significantly correlated with
unseating an incumbent governor, with a correlation coefficient of roughly 0.15. At the
same time, changes in neighbors' tax liabilities are negatively correlated with defeat of an
incumbent in a given state, with a correlation coefficient of roughly —0.10.Thuswhile
neighbors' tax changes are positively correlated with a given state's tax change, they are
negatively correlated with the defeat of that state's incumbent.
111. Theoretical Models
For ease of exposition, we divide the theoretical analysis into two parts. In the first
of these, tax setting is assumed to be non—strategic. Even here, however, information
about the tax policy of neighbors may be important to spot whether the government in
your own jurisdiction is good or bad. More interesting, however, is the case where the
incumbent can set taxes strategically, i.e. mindful of the impact that he is having on the
probability of being re—elected. Section 111.2 considers what happens in this case.
IlL 1 A Model Without Strategic Behavior
Consider a single "jurisdiction" whose government provides one unit of a public
service of a given quality'0, financed entirely by taxes. The cost of providing public
services is initially c and is assumed to be known by voters, but there is shock each period,
denoted by 9, which is not observed by the voter and which is persistent. Shocks are
'°The assumption that quality is fixed is extreme, particularly so in an empirical context.
More generally, one might imagine the government choosing tax/quality pairs. The
absence of any measure of quality in our empirical work is apt to mean that we understate
the sensitivity of voting to taxes, since some tax increases may be reflecting increases in
quality and should not therefore result in taxpayer hostility.7
drawn from a finite set {°1"'0N} with 01 <
02<°N'where 01 =Band=, and
where N is potentially large. We shall also suppose that the distance betweenand
is a constant 5". Let (°i) denote the probability of observing the value O. We will also
use the notation F(oi) a _1f(O). Shocks also have mean zero, i.e., E 1Of(91) =0.
Assumption 1: The density function for the cost shock has a (strict) monotone likelihood
ratio property, i.e. it satisfies 1(O)If( 0l)isdecreasing in i.
Each jurisdiction is run by elected officials. These are of two kinds, which we refer to as
"good" and "bad." The former provide the service at cost, while the latter are either
inefficient and/or rent seeking, charging more than the cost of services in taxes.
Specifically, we assume that a "bad" official charges c+O+X to provide public services,
where the amount of "rent", X, is exogenously given'2.
The model has two time periods and in period one an incumbent is elected, with
probability p of being good. After observing the taxes levied by the period one incumbent,
the voters'3 decide whether or not to re—elect him, bearing in mind that the probability
that his successor is good is also p.
Voters' care about minimizing their taxes'4, the expected future value of which
depends on the probability that the incumbent is good given the tax that he levied in
liThis can be relaxed at the expense of having to deal with some cumbersome inequalities.
'2For analytical cleanliness, we assume that X/5 is an integer.
'The simplest way to think about the model is to imagine a large group of identical voters.
More generally, we could use some kind of representative (e.g. median) voter model. We
would then be looking at the taxes faced by the median voter when determining the
re—election rule. Our specification is for analytical simplicity —nothingessential follows
from it.
'4We are abstracting from the possibility that higher taxes can mean higher quality. This
might give rise to the possibility of signaling by good officials choosing a package of quality
and taxes which would not be mimicked by the bad. Believing in such a model would, of
course, pre—suppose that there are convenient and objectively measurable quality variables
which can be used for signaling purposes. The analysis by Bradford, Malt and Oates
(1969) does not make one sanguine about this possibility.8
period 1. Letting Q(r) denote this probability we have, using Bayes rule, that
1 TE {O+c ,..,O+X+c—5}
(2.1) Q(r) ={ pf(r)-(1)f(r-c—X)TE {+X+c,.. ,+c}
0 r E{V+S+c,.,U+c+X}.
If the tax rate is below O+X+c, then the incumbent must be good, while if it exceeds +c,
then he must be bad. In between, the standard Bayes rule formula is used to derive this
probability. An important question concerns when Q(r) is monotone decreasing in r, so
that a higher tax rate always leads an individual to reduce his estimate of the probability
that the incumbent is good.It is straightforward to check that this is true if the
probability distribution satisfies assumption 1 given above, since then f(r—c—X)/f(r—-c) is
an increasing function of r. Given the beliefs represented by Q(i-), expected taxes from
unseating an incumbent are
T(r) ap{Q(r)r + [1—Q(r)](r—X)} + (1—p){Q(r)(T+X) + [1—Q(r)]r}.
(22)
=r-[p(1—Q(r))--Q(r)(1—p)]X.
The first two terms on the first line represent expected taxes if the new official is good. If
the incumbent was also good, then the expected tax is r, while if the incumbent is bad,
expected taxes are r—X(recallingthat the period 2 shock has mean zero). The second two
terms on the first line refer to the case where the new official is bad. Again there are two
cases. Either the incumbent was bad, expected taxes equal the current tax, or else the
incumbent was good and the voter is worse off with new expected taxes of r+X. Equation
(2.2) reveals a trade—off in electing a new official. While taxes may be lower for any given
shock, it is also possible to turn out a good official and replace him with a bad one.9
Thereelection decision compares r with T(r). First we establish two obvious facts.
If r >+cthen, since Q(r) =0,there is no loss to trying a new official. Similarly, if T<
O+X+c,then Q(r) =1and there is no gain to electing someone different. Finally, observe
that the expected difference in taxes between a new official's government and the
incumbent's T(T)—T(= p(1—Q(r))--(1--p)Q(r))is decreasing in Taslong as Q(r) is strictly
decreasing which, as we showed above, is true under Assumption 1. These facts imply that
there exists a r E{O+X+c,..,V+c},such that it is better to re—elect the incumbent for a
second term if and only if r ￿ r.Hence sufficiently low tax governments are worth
re—electing and high tax ones are not. In fact, r is unique since Q(r) is strictly decreasing.
Thus we have
Proposition 1: Under Assumption 1, there exists a unique r E{9-i-X+c,.+c} which
satisfies: r =min{rIQ(r) ￿ p}, such that if taxes exceed r then the elected official is not
returned to office for a second term.
This says that voters use the following rule: if the probability that the incttmbent is
good is less than the probability that a new elected official will be good, then unseat the
incumbent. This result is illustrated in Figure 1.
Next we introduce yardstick competition, by supposing that there are two
jurisdictions, labeled A and B, with correlated costs of public provision. To fix ideas, we
consider the case of perfectly correlated cost shocks. If TA—cA >TB_cB,then it is known
with certainty that the incumbent in jurisdiction A is bad and he will be unseated. The
opposite on all counts holds if TA_cA <
TB_CB.If rç-c =rB_CB,then there is no
information to be learned by using neighboring jurisdictions as a yardstick. The potential
of using neighbors is nonetheless apparent from this example. The probability of reelecting
a bad official in jurisdiction A is (1_p)F(rA—cA_X)whereno comparison is used and is
(1_p)2F(TA_cA_X) when a comparison with jurisdiction B is made.10
The model can be generalized to allow for imperfectly correlated costs. We focus on
jurisdiction A; the case of the other jurisdiction is similar. Let (0A'0B) denote the joint
"density function' for costs of public service provision.15 Using Bayes rule, the probability
of having a good incumbent is now given by
1 TAE{O,..,9+X—S}
pg(TA.-CA,TB_CB)
(2.3)Q(TA,TB)= { TA E {O+X,..,}
0 TA e{V+o,..,
whereg(w,y)pf(w,y) + (1—p)f(w,y—X),1S The probability of having a good incumbent
depends on TA and TB.Werequire that Q(.)bedecreasing in TA,parallelingthe result
above, and increasing in TB.Thesecond of these implies that higher neighbors' taxes
increase the probability that your incumbent is good. Whether this holds depends upon
properties of the function g(.). We will assume the following:
Assumption 2: The density function g(.) satisfies:
isincreasing in TA and decreasing TB.
Thefirst of these extends the monotone likelihood ratio property to the model where
neighbors' taxes matter, while the latter is the monotone likelihood ratio property for two
random variables (see Milgrom (1981)).1T The latter gives an interpretation in terms of
good news and bad news. Here, we require that observing a high taxes in a neighboring
'5We assume that range of potential cost shocks, i.e. support of 0, is the same in both
jurisdictions.
6Note that g(w,y) is a mixture of densities.Unfortunatelymany properties of the
underlying densities f(.) (e.g. log concavity and total positivity) are not preserved under
miung.
'This property also implies that the random variables w and y are affiliated. An alternative
interpretation is in terms of the theory of total positivity (Karlin (1968)).11
jurisdiction is bad news for any given jurisdiction, i.e. it makes voters think that costs are
higher in their own jurisdiction.It is straightforward to check that under these
assumptions, Q(.)isdecreasing inand increasing in TB.
Theexpected taxes paid by a voter after throwing out the incumbent, as a function
of both TA and TB, are
T(TA,TB) P{Q(TA,TB)TA + [1—Q(TA,TB)](rA_x)}
(2.2')
+ (1_p){Q(TA,TB)(TA+x) + [l—Q(rA,rB)]rA}.
The re—election rule now involves equating this with TA to obtain ;A(TB). The main
implications of yardstick competition are given in
Proposition 2: Q(TA,TB) is decreasing in TA and increasing in TB,sothat T(rA,rB)
increasing in TB. Thus the unique TAruin {TA Q(TA,TB) ￿ p} above which the
incumbent will be unseated is a non—decreasing function of TB and jurisdictions with low
tax neighbors are less tolerant of high taxes.
Proof: The probability that the incumbent is good, Q(TA,TB), is increasing inTB and
decreasing in TA, implying that lower neighbors' taxes will lead to less tolerance of high
taxes and will lower 1A• To see this, note that the critical TA is now defined by
rnin{TAJ Q(TA,TB) ￿ p}. The fact that Q(TA,TB) is increasing in TB and decreasing in TA
now establishes the result. o
The result that voters are less tolerant of high taxes is easily seen from Figure 1. If
Q(TA,TB) is increasing in TB, then so is T(TA,TB). The effect of yardstick competition,12
when neighbors charge TB(<TB), is to reduce TAtoTA in Figure 1. Thus the use of
neighbors' taxes as a benchmark makes voters less tolerant, i.e., more ready to vote out
high tax governments. These results hinge on the assumption of correlation between costs
in neighboring jurisdictions. If the jurisdictions' costs were independent, i.e., 16A'°B =
hA(OA)hB(OB),then ph(OB) + (1_p)h(OB_X) cancels from top and bottom of (2.3),
leaving Q(.)independentof TB.
With Q(.)decreasingin TAandincreasing in TB,weare more likely to observe
incumbents being voted out of office when their neighbors have relatively low tax rates and
when they have relatively high tax rates. We will test this in the empirical analysis below.
The above model yields some basic ideas, but it falls short. Indeed, the term competition
seems misplaced when elected officials are not choosing taxes. Our next task is to extend
the model to allow officials to manipulate the tax rate to their advantage, knowing that
this affects the probability that they will be reelected.
111.2 Strategic Behavior
We now allow the amount of cost exaggeration by government officials to be
endogenous, reflecting their desire to be reelected. We continue to consider a two period
time horizon where the only issue for the voter is whether to keep the incumbent for a
second term.18 We shall suppose that elected officials can engage in rent seeking by raising
taxes in a way that does not benefit voters'9. We will, however, assume that there is an
upper bound on the amount of reot seeking that is feasible. This may be due to a
'This is similar, in certain respects, to the model of political competition under imperfect
information in Austen—Smith and Banks (1989) and Banks and Sundaram (1991).
'The exact interpretation of the activities which politicians engage in is not that important.
Note however that we are not allowing funds that are diverted from service provision to
affect the probability of being re—elected, e.g. by giving inflated procurement contracts to
politically influential individuals. The model could be extended to allow for this. To the
extent that this is possible, it is less likely that individuals will engage in as much cost
exaggeration in the second period, since spending on such activities is not worthwhile in the
second period of office.13
technological constraint, reflecting the maximum number of extravagances which a
governor can afford, or else it may be due to a desire on the part of politicians not to lose
their reputations (or go to jail) after they leave office. Hence even a bad politician finds
some value to not going down in history as a terrible spendthrift.
We shall continue to assume that elected officials are of two types. Again the good
ones provide the service at cost while the bad ones like padding costs by an amount which
we denote by x. Bad politicians have utility functions given by
x for x <X
(3.1) u(x) =
L Xotherwise,
where X is the upper bound on x. Again, we shall suppose that elected officials know C
while voters do not. The latter again must choose between sticking with the incumbent
and electing a new official, when the probability of getting someone good is p. Politicians
choose x knowing the reelection rule employed by voters. We shall restrict the elected
officials to choosing tax rates from the set {91+c,...,V+c,D+X-i-c}. Once again, we start
with the case of a single jurisdiction in isolation. Let Q(T)denotethe beliefs of the voters
that the politician is good given that he has a chosen a tax rate of r, when behavior is
strategic. As above we will assume that this is derived from Bayes rule.
The game played between politicians and voters has moves as follows. First, the
politician observes the shock, 0, and chooses taxes. The voters then form their beliefs
about the politician's type and choose whether or not to re—elect him. We will use t(r) to
denote the expected taxes in period 2 from sticking with the incumbent when the tax rate
is rand T(r) to denote the expected taxes after voting in a new incumbent.
In our two period world, we know that if a bad incumbent is ever reelected then he
will make rents of X in the second period. However, he may choose to behave strategically
by taking a rent reduction in the first period in order to gain re—election. Payoffs are x in14
the first period and X in the second, if reelected. We use p to denote the discount rate used
by the politicians20.
Definition: An equilibrium2' of the model satisfies three conditions:
(a) argmax {r—O—c+pI{r￿r}XI TC_Oi ￿ X} for i =
(h)r =min{rIt(r)S T(r)} and
(c) Q(•)isderived using Bayes rule,
where I{. }isthe indicator function anddenotes the tax charged by a bad official if the
cost shock is O.
Thus bad politicians are optimizing and voters are using Bayes rule in deciding
whom to re—elect, with the objective of minimizing expected taxes.
Proposition 3: The elected official's tax choice depends on whether U falls into one of three
regions described as follows:
(i) If U{O,..,r—X—-c}, then=U+X+c
(ii) If U {r—X+5—c,..,r—.(1—p)X—c}, then =rand
(iii) If {r—(1—p)X+S—c,..,7J}, then=U+X+c.
The proof follows from the elected official's optimization problem for given r and is
illustrated in Figure 2. In the first of the ranges for U, the cost of providing public services
is low and it is possible for a bad politician to get reelected while still doing the maximum
amount of rent seeking, X. The second range has each incumbent reducing taxes by doing
less rent seeking in order to be re—elected. Each levies a tax at the borderline of what he is
20For analytical convenience, we assume that (l—p)X{01'••'0N}• Again this could be
relaxed but at the expense of considerably increased complexity.
2OTl,is is essentially a sequential equilibrium of the game between elected officials and voters.15
able to get away with while still being re—elected. In effect, we have an interval of pooling
with different cost levels resulting in the same taxes being levied. Finally, in the third
range, the costs are so high that it is not worthwhile for the politician ever to reduce his
rent seeking in order to be reelected. He makes X in the first period and is thrown from
office right away thereafter.
Referring to Figure 2, it is interesting to note that the tax rate is discontinuous in 9.
Above Car—(1—p)X—c, it ceases to be worthwhile to seek reelection and taxes jump up to
signify that a politician prefers to make hay. In this way, our model allows for a threshold
effect in tax setting. Politicians might fight very hard to stay in with their electorate but,
if costs are just too high, such attempts become futile and it is not worth trying to be
reelected at all. What is key to the model, as we demonstrate below, is that r depends
upon tax rates (and more generally other economic conditions) in other states.
Consider now the determination of T,whichwe do by considering the expected taxes
in period 2 with and without reelection of the incumbent. In contrast to the case with
strategic behavior outlined above, the expected taxes from reelecting the incumbent may
no longer be the same in the second period if the incumbent is re—elected, since the latter
may be a bad official behaving strategically. Thus the expected taxes after re—electing the
incumbent are
(3.2) t(r) a Q(r)r + (1—Q(r))E{O+X+cI r & incumbent bad),
where E{.} is the expectations operator.The expected taxes from seeking a new
incumbent are also different in this case, being given by
T(r)a pQ(r)r+Q(r)(1—p)(r+X)+(1—Q(r))(1—p)E{9-i-X+c r&incumbent bad)
(3.3)
+ p(1—Q(r))E{O+c r&cincumbent bad),16
The first term refers to cases where the incumbent was good and so is the new official. The
second reflects the case where the incumbent was good but a bad official is elected in his
place. Term three reflects the possibility that the incumbent is bad and the newly elected
official is too and the fourth term gives the period two payoff when a bad official is
replaced by a good one.
We define i-byfinding the lowest rsuchthat (3.2) is less than or equal to (3.3).
The story is essentially as in the previous sub—section —thereis a critical rabovewhich an
individual will be voted from office. Again we can show that this will be in the interval
[4+X+c0+c] and is defined by finding the rsatisfyingmin{rI Q(r)￿p}. This solution
exists and is unique if Q(T)isdecreasing which follows from Assumption 1.
Proposition 4: Under Assumption 1, if tax setting is strategic then there exists a unique r
definedby min{rIQ(r) ￿p}, such that if taxes exceed rtheincumbent is unseated.
Moreover this risno higher, given X, than in the absence of strategic behavior.
Proof: See Appendix. a
This result makes intuitive sense. Since elected officials can lower taxes to get
re—elected, voters compensate by voting out relatively low tax governments —thereis a
greater chance of bad officials "masquerading" as good ones to get a second term.
Next we introduce neighboring jurisdictions with correlated costs. This parallels the
the previous sub-section —lowerneighbor's taxes may lead to a less tolerant electorate,
although tax setting behavior iinowaffected by yardstick competition.Yardstick
competition does, however, have a double edged effect; taxes are not uniformly lower for
first period bad incumbents. Imagine that there are two neighboring jurisdictions (A and
B) with imperfectly correlated costs and tax rates TAandTB.Theoniy way in which the
tax decision of jurisdiction B affects behavior in jurisdiction A is by changing TAandthis17
depends upon how Q(TA,TB)isaffected by TB.Topreserve the result that an increase in
raises TA, we need to have Q(.)increasingin TB.Thisis harder to establish for the
strategic model. Indeed even writing down how beliefs depend upon TBisnow rather
complicated, since the probability of observing TBmusttake into account the strategic
behavior of elected officials in jurisdiction 2. To give the reader an idea of the types of
expressions obtained, we write down the case where TB= TB inthe Appendix. The basic
principles established in the analysis of the non—strategic case are again relevant. Q(.)
willbe increasing in TB and decreasing TA if Prob{TA&TB Ijurisdiction1 being
bad)/Prob{TA&TB Ijurisdiction1 being good} is decreasing in TB and increasing in TA.
Theexact conditions required for this to be true depend upon which case we are in and
little is gained by stating them all. Instead, we shall suppose that they hold and examine
their implications for tax setting. To do so, we refer to Proposition 3 and imagine a
reduction in TA.
The effect of a reduction in TA On tax setting is best seen with reference to Figure 3.
It also illustrates the somewhat double—edged effect of yardstick competition on tax setting
behavior in period 1.First, note that since TA is lower taxes are lower for all the
individuals who "pool" by setting taxes at this level. In addition, the level of costs at
which individuals begin to behave strategically in order to be reelected, by charging taxes
of TA, begins at a lower level. Hence, fewer low cost jurisdictions do maximal rent seeking
in period 1. In high cost jurisdictions, however, some incumbents decide to do maximal
rent seeking rather than cutting taxes to TA. Hence taxes in period one may actually be
higher, although this may still be beneficial to jurisdiction A voters, because of improved
sorting of good from bad. Even with strategic behavior at work, the basic idea —that
yardstick competition can serve to sort good from the bad elected officials remains robust.
It also provides a way of reducing rent seeking among bad incumbents.
Proposition 5: If a lower tax rate in jurisdiction B makes voters less tolerant, then first18
period taxes will be lower if U <TA_(1—.p)Xand will be higher on the interval U E
{ r—(l—-p)X,...,rA—X}. On average, bad incumbents are thrown out of office more often
after one period than in the absence of comparisons with neighbors.
This section has specified a model where observing neighboring jurisdictions' taxes
affects voting and tax setting decisions. This underpins the empirical analysis presented
below. While the analysis has been very specific, the main ideas are quite robust, the
essential ingredients being that voters are imperfectly informed about the costs of
providing public services and evaluate incumbent politicians based upon their performance
while in office. If costs are correlated across jurisdictions, then voters take comparative
assessments seriously. This squares with the previous theoretical literature on relative
performance evaluation.22 Thus, despite the specificity of the model, the ideas seem worthy
of confrontation with the data, i.e. looking for a link between tax setting and election
outcomes. First, however, it is necessary to provide an empirical specification —the
subject of the next section.
W. Empirical Specification
The empirical model uses the main idea of the theory —thattax setting agents
take into account the impact of tax changes on the probability that they will be re—elected.
We use the change in taxes to proxy for r— c.23Innovations to costs can be thought of as
fiscal crises due, for example, to increased medicaid expenses, increased infrastructure
expenses, or recession driven revenue shortfalls. It is after such events that citizens must
determine whether the change in taxes is "appropriate." We use Artodenote the change
in taxes. Since it may take an incoming governor more than a year to fully implement his
22Again, see Holmstrom (1982) for an example of the results in this area.
23This is strictly speaking inaccurate. Last period's taxes also reflect whether the incumbent
was good or bad. Incorporating this in a structural model would require a considerably
more complicated analysis which we leave for future work.19
tax program, we will focus on changes in taxes paid in every year (t) relative to those paid
two years ago (t—2). The reader should note that similar results are obtained if we use the
differences between years t and (t—3).
Consider the decision of a representative voter on the eve of an incumbent's
reelection. We suppose that he compares the tax increase expected during the incumbent's
next term with that expected from the opposition. Using the above notation, he will wish
to reelect if and only if t'(t.r;tr_1)< T'(r1;T_), wheret'(r4r_i) represents
the expected tax increase in state i in period 2 if the incumbent is reelected,
T'(trj;fr...j) is the expected tax change under a new incumbent, and is the tax
increase observed in state i's neighbors during this two year period.
To estimate the probability of reelection function, we put this into a random
utilities framework, allowing for the possibility that there is a shock to preferences, denoted
by c1, that affects whether or not the representative voter carries through his pre—specified
intentions. This shock is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation
In the empirical specification we will take a linear approximation to the gain from
re—electing the incumbent; )'(r4r_) a AT'(rj;Ar_) —t'(rj;r).We can thus
represent the probability of seeing an incumbent reelected as
(4.1) Prob{fl'(r;1ii...j) > --e1}4((/9x1 + + 72r_)Io)a
where (.)isthe cumulative distribution function of the standard normal and x1 denotes a
vector of other characteristics thought to influence the representative voter.
The incumbent who has the option of running for another term in office faces the
following optimization decision in his choice of taxes at date20
(4.2) V(o) =
Max{r C —c+ R'(r4r..j)pE{V+i(c+9i+1l)},
where we have normalized the payoff from not being reelected to zero. The first order
condition associated with (4.2), assuming an interior solution,24 is
(4.3) 1 =— rpE{V+i(cj+O+77)}
=
where (•)isthe density of the standard normal. This becomes
(4.4) =
—13x12—i +
If we use the linear approdmation '(_E{V+i(c+O1+77)}'/p7i) for some vector
of state and incumbent specific characteristics then we have the following equation for
taxes in state i
(4.5) =— (f3/y)x +(a/'yi)zt —
wherewe have made a standard identifying assumption that=1.
To estimate (4.5), we allow both for idiosyncratic shocks and for year effects (T).
The latter may enter if, for example, business cycles or changes in federal fiscal policy
move states' taxes in a synchronous way.25 Equation (4.5) then becomes
24The assumption of there being an interior solution is a reasonably strong one. As we saw
in the previous section, as the potential for shocks becomes small, the tax rate will fall into
one of three ranges with a discontinuity at a threshold value of 9. We are not permitting
this here.
25We also allowed for spatial correlation in the shocks received by neighboring states.
However, in estimation we found no spatial correlation in the errors, and we removed21
(4.5') =_-(/7l)xit+ (a/71)zit —(72/7i)T_it+ ur+Lijt
=/3x+a zt+r+T+i
Because of the potential interaction between neighboring states' tax increases, on
the right side of (4.5') may be endogenous. To get consistent estimates of the coefficients
(fi/'y1), (a,71) and (2/1) in this case, we may use either an instrumental variables
approach or a maximum likelihood estimation scheme. Instrumental variable estimation
will provide a check that correlation in taxes is not due to a common exogenous shock
experienced by neighbors: once instrumented, correlation in taxes is due only to those
parts of neighbors' tax changes that are attributable to the state economic and
demographic variables used as instruments.Theory suggests that 3=
a =(a/71),and=(2/1)Tests of these over—identifying restrictions wiU be
discussed below.
After instrumenting for tax changes in state i (r1) and in neighboring states
we can estimate coefficients in the incumbent reelection equation (4.1) using a
probit equation. Recognizing that the shocks to the reelection equation (4.1) are likely to
be correlated with the shocks to the tax equation (4.5), we propose to estimate the
equations jointly.
To do so, we express the joint density m(rt,dt) of tax changes (r) and
incumbent defeat (d1t=1 if incumbent defeated) as the product of the marginal density of
tax changes f(ri) and the conditional density of incumbent defeat, conditional on the
value of the change in taxes.2 The joint density m(rjt,dt) can then be written:
reference to it here to simplify the presentation.
2SThis technique receives general discussion in Heckman (1978); derivation of this specific
density is presented in the Appendix.22
q 6.
(4.6) f(rt)[d j'q(1/v•exP(_t2/2)dt + (1_-dt) [(1/V2exp(_t2/2)dt]
In representing the marginal density f(r), one must account for spatial correlation in the
dependent variable. This can be done in a straightforward manner; see Case (1991) for
details. In (4.6), the exponent 6= 1if an election is being held and equal to zero
otherwise. In this way, an observation is allowed to contribute tax information to the log
likelihood when election information is not present. The limit of integration, q, is
—ct_(c/a)ut (.) 5
where c represents the observable portion of the right hand side of the reduced form for
equation (4.1), after the reduced forms for and have been substituted in, and ,c is
the covariance of the errors for the reduced forms of equations (4.1) and (4.5).27
The likelihood for our election/tax setting equations is then
(4.8) Log L =
Identification of parameters is straightforward:the tax setting components of (4.6)
identify c, j,' andço. The coefficient on neighbors' tax changes, ,isidentified from
correlation between neighboring states' explanatory variables and a given state's tax
change. The election components of (4.6) identify ,'y1and 2' with the assumption that
the variance of is 1; a =1.
Note that there are two sets of over—identifying restrictions that may be tested
using this model. First, the ratio of (—2I1)' identified from the election components of
21See Appendix for details.23
(4.6), should equal spatial correlationidentified from the tax setting components of (4.6).
In addition, variables thought to influence a governor's reelection odds (elements of x) that
are not thought to determine the incumbent's expected payoff from reelection (elements of
z) provide a second set of over—identifying restrictions: the ratio of (—f3/'),identifiedfrom
the election components of (4.6) should equal corresponding elements of,identifiedfrom
the tax setting components.
Consistent starting values for the maximum likelihood estimation of (4.6) are
available from the instrumental variables estimation of (4.1) and (4.5'). Both sets of
estimates will be presented in Section V, together with the results of tests of over
identifying restrictions.
V. Results
We test our model by estimating equations for unseating of governors and changes
in taxes in the 48 states in the continental United States. Table 3 presents probit
estimates of incumbent governor defeat and retirement as a function of the tax change
observed in the official's own state, the tax change observed in neighboring jurisdictions,
change in state per capita income (in 1982 dollars), change in neighboring states' per capita
income, and governor's age. We include the change in the state's per capita income to test
whether income growth affects the incumbent's chances for reelection and neighboring
states' income changes to allow for the possibility that states may be comparing themselves
to their neighbors in this dimension as well. The incumbent governor's age is included to
help control for retirement being due to physical, rather than political, reasons.
The first two columns of Table 3 use TAXSIM data, available for 85 elections
between 1979—88. In this estimation, the tax change is defined as the change in the
effective income tax liability of joint filers who earned $40000 in 1977. The second two
columns use the longer series on per capita sales and income tax revenues, available for 266
elections from 1962—89. For each data set, we report simple probits of governor defeat and24
probits in which own tax changes have been instrumented to reflect the joint determination
of tax changes with election results. The instrumented estimates in Table 3, show that an
increase in a state's taxes has a positive and significant effect on the probability that an
incumbent is defeated. In both samples, a doliar increase in taxes yields an impact on
incumbent defeat roughly comparable in size to a 25 cent reduction in income per capita.
However, the impact of a tax change appears to be muted if it is accompanied by a
corresponding increase in neighbors' taxes. In both samples, an increase in the average
taxes paid in neighboring states has a negative and significant effect on the probability that
an incumbent is unseated. Furthermore, negative growth in state income and increases in
the governor's age lead to a reduced probability of reelection, with the effect of governor's
age being large and significant.In the longer data series, growth in state income in
neighboring states appears to reduce the impact of growth in one's own state, suggesting
that relative performance in state income growth may be more important for reelection
than absolute performance.
A preliminary look at results from the tax change equation is presented in Table 4.
We model tax change as a function of state economic variables, including growth in real
state income per capita and state unemployment, and as a function of state demographic
variables, including change in the proportion elderly (> 65 yrs. old) and in the proportion
young (< 18 yrs. old) in the population. We also include year effects, to absorb the impact
of changes in national economic climate and changes in Federal fiscal behavior that may
have similar effects on all states.
If tax setting behavior is strategic, we expect state tax changes to respond to
neighbors' changes in taxes (and vice versa). To cope with this endogeneity problem, we
estimate the tax change equation using two stage least squares.25 Results of doing so, with
and without instrumenting, are reported in Table 4 for both data series. In both samples,
28The neighbors' instrument list includes neighbors' demographic and economic variables,
demographic variables lagged, and year effects.25
neighbors' tax changes appear to have a large and significant effect on a state's own tax
change. The results using the TAXSIM data, presented in the first column, suggest that a
one dollar increase/reduction in neighbors' income tax liability, ceteris paribia, will result
in more than a 50 cent increase/reduction in a state's own tax liability.29 Since neighbors'
tax changes are instrumented, this correlation is not attributable to common unobservable
shocks that may have hit neighboring states; the correlation is in that component of
neighbors' tax increases that is attributable to neighbors' observable variables, used here as
instruments. Two stage least squares estimation using the longer data series suggests that,
for income and sales taxes taken together, the effect of a dollar increasein neighbors' taxes
results in roughly a 25 cent increase in a state's own taxes.
As the two tax variables are different measures of state taxes —thefirst being the
effective income tax liability for a particular type of filer and the second being the sales
and income taxes collected per capita in the state —weexpect them to respond differently
to changes in economic and demographic variables.For example, if unemployment
increases in the state, this is apt to place a fiscal straln on the state and result in an
increase in the income tax liability of $40000 filers. This is consistent with the results
presented in column 1:ceteris paribus, an increase in the unemployment rate has a
positive and significant effect on the tax liability of $40000 filers. However, using instead
the per capita sales and income taxes collected by the state as a tax measure, we might
expect increases in the unemployment rate to reduce the government's sales and income
tax revenues. This is consistent with results in column 2: ceterü paribus, an increase in
unemployment reduces the taxes collected by the state. The same reasoning suggests that
income growth may be negatively related to the income tax liability of $40000 filers, and
positively related to the average sales and income taxes collected. This is also consistent
29The point estimate on neighbors' tax change does depend heavily on the variables used as
instruments. Point estimates ranged from 0.25 to 0.75. In all cases, neighbors' tax changes
were, however, significant when instrumented on neighbors' economic and demographic
variables and demographic variables lagged.26
with results presented in Table 4.
With respect to the longer time series, note that when governors are prohibited by
law from standing for reelection, taxes in the state are raised by roughly 7 dollars per
person. This is consistent with governors playing an "end game," making hay in their last
term when they know that they must leave. This result is also consistent, however, with a
model in which the only politically viable time to raise taxes is when a reelection does not
hang in the balance. These issues will be addressed in future work.
Two variables, governors' age and neighbors' income change, have been added to the
tax setting equation because of their influence on the governor's reelection odds. Using the
notation of Section IV, these are variables that belong to x (determining reelection) but not
to z (payoff from reelection). These are variables that may be used in over—identification
tests; we will discuss these tests for the maximum likelihood estimates below.
The results in Table 4 are consistent in the presence of correlation between shocks
to the voting and tax setting equations. They are also consistent if there is spatial
correlation in the errors of the tax setting equation, because we have instrumented for
neighbors' tax changes. While these estimates are, therefore, robust, they are not efficient
if there is correlation in the shocks to the tax setting and voting equations. For this
reason, we have estimated these equations jointly, presenting the results in Table 5.
The results of joint estimation for coefficients on tax setting variables are almost
identical to those found in Table 4. With respect to the tax setting equation, neighbors'
tax changes continue to have a positive and significant effect on a given states' tax
changes; a dollar's increase in neighbors' taxes results in roughly a 10 to 15 cent increase
in a given state's taxes.Using the tax liability data (column 1), increases in
unemployment raise the income tax liability of $40000 filers. The opposite continues to
hold for data on taxes collected (column 2). In addition, both samples reveal that taxes
increase with a larger proportion of elderly in the population.
Consonant with the theory presented above, the probability of incumbent defeat is27
significantly increased by an increase in state taxes. However, this effect is canceled if
neigbbors increase their taxes simultaneously. In both data series these effects appear large
and significant.
We can formally test whether the sensitivity to neighbors' tax changes is of a size
consistent with the yardstick competition model, by testing whether =2'1In the
shorter data series on income tax liability, the likelihood ratio test is 3.76; one rejects the
hypothesis that the numbers are the same in a 94% confidence interval. In the longer data
series on sales and income taxes collected, the likelihood ratio test is 3.1; one rejects the
hypothesis in a 91% confidence interval. While these rejections hold in a 90% confidence
interval, they fail in a 95% interval. Notwithstanding, we find the results to be broadly
consistent with the model presented in sections 3 and 430
Twofurther comments on the interpretation of our results are worth making. First,
there is the question of whether a more traditional Tiebout story based on factor mobility
is consistent with our results. A negative effect of own taxes on re—election is hard to
justify in a Tiebout framework: individuals should move if they are dissatisfied with the
tax change. This would leave only contented voters in the state and thus enhance the
probability that the incumbent is re—elected. Likewise, higher taxes in a neighboring state
would lead to an influx of voters into a state that disliked high taxes, thus lowering the
average tolerance to taxes at home. Thus high neighbors' taxes tends to decrease the
probability that an incumbent will survive. Hence, both of the predictions of the Tiebout
model would be contrary to what we find in our empirical results.
There is, however, an alternative interpretation of our results3' where the
importance of neighbors' taxes represents something other than yardstick competition.
30Note that we cannot reject the null of equality in our second set of over—identification
tests:=(—/') However,this is only because the standard errors on the coefficients
in the tax setting equation are large.
31We are grateful to Richard Zeckhauser for suggesting this.28
Imagine a world where individuals have a notion of what a reasonable response to a given
cost shock would look like, and that incumbents get "punished" for transgressing this line.
We have no direct measure of the reasonable tax increase, although we might use
neighbors' tax increases as an instrument for it. This is similar to putting the expected
values of performance variables in voting equations and testing to see whether it is
deviations from these which affect whether an individual is reelected (see, for example,
Peltzman (1990)).
VI. Concluding Remarks
This paper has investigated tax setting in a voting model.It has focused on
yardstick competition in states' tax setting decisions. After formalizing this, we estimated
a model using data between 1960 and 1989. The results are encouraging to the view that
vote seeking and tax setting are tied together through the nexus of yardstick competition.
Tax changes appear to be a significant determinant of who is elected, rationalizing effort
put into curbing tax increases which are out of line with neighbors. There remains scope
for elaborating on the theory and the evidence presented here with more sophisticated
models.Regarding interstate governmental performance as a place where yardstick
competition might be important does seem to make sense given that, as required by the
theory, there is likely to be a significant common component to agents' environments and
asymmetric information between voters and elected officials. Our analysis constitutes a
first attempt to take some of these ideas to the data. Looking for further implications of
this is, we believe, an interesting avenue for future investigations.29
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Appendix A: Beliefs in the Model with Strategic Behavior
1. Beliefs with the strategic behavior described in Proposition 3 are given by:
1 T E I.+c,1+X+c)
pf(rc)—ip)f r-X--c)
T E[+c,X, r+c)
Q(r)= pf(r-)+(1-pFr-(-b)X--c)-F(r-X-c) T= T
pf(r)+1p)fr—X--) rE (r+c,U+c
o TE (+c,U+X+c].




pg(r_c,r + (i—p g (rA—CA—X, TB—cB) -
— prA—CA,rB---cB Q( ) —
pg(r—c,r0_c)+t_p)G(rA_cA_ 1-p)X, rB_cB)_G(rA_XcA,rB_cB)
pg( TA—C A,TB—c B)







where g(w,y) pf(w,y)+(i—p)f(w,y—X) and
G(w,y) =pEfg(w_z,y) +(i_p)fkf.g(w_z,y_rJ), where 0k X and 9(1—p)X.32
Appendix B: Proof of Proposition 4
First we show that Q(r)isdecreasing under Assumption 1. To see this, note that if
strategic tax setting behavior obeys Proposition 3, then (as shown in the Appendix)
-
pf(r—c)+(1—p){F(r--(1—p)X—c)—F(r---X--c)}
Thus Q(i-) is decreasing in rif{F(r—(1—p)X--c)—F(r--X--c)}/f(r—c) is increasing. We now
show that this hold under Assumption 1. Leta r—(1—p)X—c, O a r—X—c and =r—c.
Then, defininga f(O), we need to show that Ef J1r/rk <4j+lri/rk+l.Defining
rif





The left hand side of this inequality can be written as where i a
and a1 a so that =1.Thus, since k >1,the desired
inequality holds ifis decreasing in i. But this is exactly Assumption 1.
To prove the second claim define TN a min{r I f(i—X--c) ￿ f(r—c)} as the critical r
for the non—strategic case.Since f(.) has a monotone likelihood ratio property, it is
unimodal. Thus f(TN_X—c) is increasing in TN—X and f(TN—c) is decreasing in TN. It
follows that f(rN—z---c) >f(rN—X—c)￿ f(r—c) for z E {X(1P)r.,X4}. Thus
F(TN—(1--p)X--c) —F(TN—X—c)=
Ef.f(O)>
wherejand£ are defined as above, but with r =TN. Theabove inequality implies that
p >Q(TN).The claim now follows from the fact that Q(•)isdecreasing. n33
Appendix C: Derivation of the Likelihood Fu.nction
To derive the likelihood function (4.6), we begin by expressing the equation of
incumbent defeat (4.1) and the tax setting equation (4.5') in their reduced forms. As long
as w is less than one in absolute value, we can express the (N' 1) vector of N states' changes
in taxes rina given year as:
(4.5'') r(I_W)_1z*—(I—Wr1Xi+
where W is a (48"48) matrix that assigns states their geographic neighbors:w = 1 if i
and jsharea border, else w = 0; where the rows of W have been normalized to sum to
one. The matrix W then assigns each state the mean value of its neighbors' action. The
matrix I is a (48"48) identity matrix. The vectors z and X are (48*k1) and (48'k2)
matrices of explanatory variables; candare (k1xl) and (k21) vectors of coefficients;
and time effects have been subsumed into the matrix z. The (48'd) vector of errors v1 are
= (I—Wy'v
where the first term is due to potential spatial correlation in the dependent variable.
In reduced form, we express the probability that the incumbent is defeated by
substituting (4.5'') above into the incumbent defeat equation (4.1) for r1, and W times
(4.5'') for
(4.1') = 1[(I_W)_1z* —(I—wWY'Xi)+ ,y2W[(I_WW)_lza* —(I_WW)_1X/9*]
+ x/ + V2
where the (N1) vector of error terms, v2, is34
V2 =+71(I—WW)'v + 72W (I—W)'u
Assuming the joint density of the disturbances is normally distributed with density
4(v1,v2), and denoting incumbent defeat by d1=1, the joint density of tax changes and
election results m(r,d) for a given year t (suppressed) is given by
1 **
m(rid.) =d[J_(AJr +(X3 —z), v2)dv2}
*
+ i_i[ r([A]r+(Xfl —za)v2)dv2]
where z 71[(IWW)1za —(I_W)_1Xj]+ y2W[(I_wW)_1za* —(I_WW)_lXjJ+X/3.
This is simply the right side of the reduced form equation (4.1). The matrix A is
(I—W); and subscripts {iJ on these matrices refer to their ith row. We use this to form
the estimated likelihood function by breaking this joint density into the marginal density
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-0.09 -0.11 -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.08
e 'Retiredare governors eligible for reelection who chose not to run and did not run for congress.Table 3
Estimation of Incumbent Defeat
Using Taxsim Data on Using Data on Changes in
Changes in Income Tax Sales +IncomeTax
Liability 1977—88 Collected
(Income Category —40,000) Per Capita 1960-89
Own Tax Change .0012 -- .0015 --
(NotInstrumented) (.0010) (.0019)
Own Tax Change -- .0062 -- .0071
(Instrumented) (.0033) (.0042)
Neighbors' Tax Change -.0039 -.0047 -.0011 -.0044
(.0020) (.0020) (.0027) (.0033)
Change in State Income -.5657 -.2570 -.4113 -.3708
(.4841) (.5183) (.2124) (.2229)
Change in Neighbors' -.1531 -.1130 .3746 .3262
State Income (.5221) (.5042) (.2183) (.2279)
Governor's Age .0724 .0748 .0246 .0327
(.0230) (.0225) (.0104) (.0111)
Number of Observations 85 85 266 242
• Governor defeated in primary or general election, or retired and did not run for congress.
'Instrumentsinclude year effects, changes in state income and unemployment, changes in
demographic variables and changes in these variables lagged.Table 4
Estimation of Tax Change
(Neighbors' Tsx Change Instrumented)*
Dependent Variables
Change in Income Tax Liability Change in Sales and Income
$40,000 Joint Filers, 1979-88 Taxes Per Capita, 1962-89
Explanatory Variables:
Neighbors' Tax Change 0.16 0.12
(0.08) (0.05)
Neighbors' Tax Change 0.65 0.27
Instrumented (0.36) (0.22)
Governor Can't Run 20.54 5.72 6.82 7.00
(24.64) (25.69) (4.64) (4.84)
State Income Per Capita -22.04 -14.39 2,58 2.63
(t -t-2) (23.19) (24.56) (2.14) (2.19)
State Unemployment Rate 16.36 17.91 -4.51 -3.87
(t -t—2) (6.69) (7.00) (1.38) (1.66)
Proportion Young 24.48 22.07 5.58 5.12
(t -t-2) (24.15) (25.01) (2.34) (2.50)
Proportion Elderly 83.31 64.44 8.80 9.29
(t -t-2) (30.33) (34.05) (4.62) (4.79)
Neighbors' State Income -8.14 18.62 -1.60 -1.89
(t -t-2) (29.49) (35.86) (2.15) (2.22)
Governor's Age -0.15 -0,11 0.27 0.27
(1.06) (1.09) (0.21) (0.22)
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 480 480 1344 1296
Two stage least squares estimation. Instrument list for neighbors' tax change includes the following
variables of neighbors: year effects, changes in state income and unemployment, changes in demographic
variables and changes in these variables lagged.Table 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (Joint)
of Voting and Tax Setting Behavior
Using Data on Changes Using Data on Changes
in Income Tax Liability in Sales and Income
1979-88 Tax Per Capita
($40,000 Joint Filers) 1962-89
Tax Change Coefficients:
Neighbors' Tax Change 0.15 0.07
(t -t-2) (0.06) (0.04)
Governor Can't Run 9.10 5.88
(34.41) (6.83)
State Income (t-t-2) -27.26 3.06
(30.89) (2.55)
State Unemployment Rate 15.40 -3.68
(t —t-2) (7.54) (1.69)
Proportion Young 23.08 6.44
(t -t-2) (25.50) (2.13)
Proportion Elderly 90.51 9.64
(t -t—2) (34.10) (3.79)
Governor's Age 0.26 0.32
(1.18) (0.27)
Neighbors' State Income -1.27 -1.71
(t —c—2) (24.40) (2.45)
Year Effects Yes Yes
Incumbent Defeat Coefficients:
Own Tax Change .015 .025
(t —t-2) (.008) (.015)
Neighbors' Tax Change -.015 -.023
(t -t-2) (.009) (.015)
State Income 0.07 -0.51
(t -t-2) (0.81) (0.22)
Neighbors' State Income -0.46 0.47
(t -t-2) (0.79) (0.23)
Governor's Age 0.06 0.02
(0.02) (0.01)
Number of Observations:
Tax Setting 480 1344
Election 85 266V 1?)—c
(i-e)X-
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